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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000141

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EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS PREL, OAS, KSUM, KPIN, CACM, CDB, XM, XR, XS, XL, MX

SUBJECT: Mexico’s Latin American Unity Summit -- Back to the Future?
REF: 10 MEXICO 127; 10 SANTIAGO 51; 10 SANTO DOMINGO 67
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D

 

¶1. (C) Summary: Mexico’s ambitious plan to use its final Rio Group
Presidency Summit (Cancun 22-23 February) to create a new more
operational forum for regional cooperation failed dramatically. The
two-day event was dominated by press accounts of ALBA country
theatrics and their usual proclivity towards third world, anti-
imperialist rhetoric. Nothing practical was achieved on the two
pressing regional priorities - Haiti (President Preval did attend but
the discussion was an obscured footnote) and Honduras (Pres. Lobo was
not even invited in deference to Venezuela/ALBA) - and Brazil and the
ALBA countries outmaneuvered the Mexicans, leaving the details of the
new organization in the hands of a Latin American and Caribbean Summit
(CALC) structure that will be managed by Brazil and Venezuela in 2011.
End Summary

 

¶2. (C) Notwithstanding President Calderon’s best intentions to create
a more practical regional forum for regionally dealing with Latin
American priorities (ref A), Mexico’s Latin American Unity summit in
the tourist resort of Cancun (22-23 February) was poorly conceived,
inadequately managed, and badly executed. The Cancun Declaration
presents a long laundry list of issues without specifying any details
on how they will be operationally translated into effective
international action. The meeting did not agree on a name for the new
organization (see below), on a date for when it will be launched, or
on any practical details (secretariat, funding, etc.) that would
indicate how the new organization would develop. Worse yet was the
press play and unofficial commentary from informed sources, that were
downright derisive of the meeting and the contradictory message it
sent about Mexico’s interests and foreign policy.

 

¶3. (C) Already at the ceremonial opening on Monday (22 February) it
was clear that things were not going well. Negotiations on the
declaration had ground down on the operational details of the
communique and Brazil and the ALBA countries were firmly resisting
Mexico’s proposal that the new forum be constituted immediately with
agreement on institutional details. Brazilian President Lula did not
want to see the CALC be subsumed before the end of his Presidency and
Venezuelan President Chavez wanted to leave his CALC Summit (Venezuela
assumes the CALC Presidency from Brazil in 2011) on schedule, and
available for a grand launching of the new forum that, as he said to
the press, would commemorate the realization of the Bolivarian themes
of Latin American solidarity in the birthplace of the “Great
Liberator.” Chavez was his usual, over the top self in proclaiming the
death of the Organization of American States (OAS), in lending a hand
to Argentine President Kirchner’s protest against British drilling for
oil in the Malvinas, and in almost coming to blows with Colombian
President Uribe over the latter’s protest of Venezuela’s economic
embargo against Colombia. Bolivian President Morales played the
supporting role as Chavez’ factotum, parroting Chavez’ speeches and
lavishing praise and compliments on Raul Castro’s Cuba. Ecuadorian
President Correa used the meeting to try and divert money laundering
allegations leveled against Ecuador, by suggesting the need for a new
“more balanced” regional mechanism to address the issue.

 

¶4. (C) Even Calderon’s own PAN party officials were privately
dismissive of the event. PAN international affairs coordinator Rodrigo
Cortez characterized the meeting as a “sad spectacle that does nothing
to project our party’s views on international priorities and the
importance of the relationship between Mexico and the United States.”
He decried the public images of Calderon “hugging and cavorting” with
Chavez, Morales and Castro and was pessimistic from the start that
anything practical would come from the meeting. “We did not even
invite Honduras, leaving them out of the meeting in order to ensure
ALBA participation - a decision that turned the meeting upside down
with regard to our concrete security and other interests.”

MEXICO 00000141 002 OF 003

 

¶5. (C) The low point of the meeting was the verbal exchange between
Uribe and Chavez at the opening day official lunch. Uribe raised
Venezuela’s economic embargo on Colombia, terming it unhelpful and
inconsistent with the region’s economic interest and at odds with
Venezuela’s strong criticism of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba. Colombia’s
Ambassador in Mexico, Luis Camilo Osorio, told the polmincouns that,
contrary to press accounts, Uribe raised the issue in a non-
confrontational way. According to Osorio and press accounts, Chavez
reacted emotionally accusing Colombia of having sent assassination
squads to kill him and ended a verbal and physical tirade with “You
can go to hell; I am leaving (the lunch).” Uribe responded, “Don’t be
a coward and leave just to insult me from a distance.” Verbal and body
language continued to escalate, until Raul Castro stepped in to urge
civilized discussion. Outside of the dining room, Venezuelan security
officials were scuffling with Mexican security guards in an attempt to
assist their President.

 

¶6. (C) Osorio was very critical of the Summit, terming it the worst
expression of Banana Republic discourse that blames all of the regions
problems on others without any practical solutions of their own.
Osorio said the Colombians had proposed working jointly on a concrete
agenda during Calderon’s recent visit to Colombia. The Mexicans, he
said, were not interested, confident that they had everything under
control. Osorio opined that “Calderon had simply put a bunch of the
worst types together in a room, expecting to outsmart them. Instead,
Brazil outplayed him completely, and Venezuela outplayed Brazil.”
There was no practical planning, there was no management of the
agenda, and there was none of the legwork that would have been needed
to yield a practical and useful outcome.

 

¶7. (C) Brazilian DCM Antonio Francisco Da Costa E Silva Neto conveyed
his country’s view that Brazil had done a better job of managing the
summit than the Mexican hosts. Brazil was able to ensure that the new
Rio Group would emerge, not from the Summit, but from ongoing
discussions in the Rio Group and the CALC, where Brazil could exert
its influence. The CALC survived and Brazil would be managing that
process as part of the troika when it turned over the presidency to
Venezuela.

 

¶8. (C) We heard similar themes from ex-Ambassador Jorge Montano, a
PRI-connected, former respected senior Mexican diplomat. He echoed
Cortez’ criticism, channeling it into an elegant but critical op-ed in
Mexico daily Universal (Feb 26). Montano’s piece, entitled “With or
Without the OAS,” reviewed briefly the history of Latin American
regional forums, also criticizing U.S. lack of attention to the region
(e.g. Summit of Americas) but noting the practical achievements
realized in the OAS. He called the Summit unnecessary and inconsistent
with Mexico’s interests and called for immediate damage control.
Montano told us that he received separate calls from Calderon and from
Foreign Secretary Espinoza, irate over his criticism.

¶9. (C) The media coverage did not in any way suggest a practical
forum and there was a good supply of criticism, in addition to
Montano’s piece, which was respectful in its choice of words. The most
damning criticism was a political cartoon in the leading daily Reforma
(Feb 24) which depicted a large Chavez gorilla, with a small Castro
perched on his back playing an accordion labeled “CanCubaZuela Group”
with a small image of Calderon dancing to the music and waving
marimbas. Osorio told us at a same day Central Bank event with leading
Mexican businessmen that there were abundant references to the cartoon
and its apt characterization of the Summit’s result.

 

Comment
------------------

 

¶10. (C) In the end Mexico was limited to agreement on a new forum but
without any specific commitments on institutional details. The Cancun
declaration is a bulging rhetorical exercise
MEXICO 00000141 003 OF 003
that reflects the lack of agreement with its general and non-specific
language. The press play leaned towards the critical side and even
those who recognized Calderon’s well-mentioned effort focused more
attention on the paltry results. Even on the issues that Mexico argued
to us before the summit were reasons for bolstering the Rio Group --
success on Colombia-Venezuela-Ecuador problem - the Summit result was
directly contrary to hopes for a new more operational mechanism in the
region.

 

¶11. (C) We have not had yet received the official GOM post-Summit
read-out from our SRE and Presidency sources - they have been busy
finishing the Declaration and doing follow up work with the Latin
American Missions. We will be shortly following up with their analysis
and comments on the way ahead, and their plans for deepening trade and
investment through a new arrangement with Brazil, announced at the end
of the Summit. Whatever their read out, this is not playing here as a
“diplomatic success,” except in some very general sense of raising the
need for more effective regional action. Unfortunately, the Cancun
Latin American Unity Summit was not an example of a new and bold step
into the future but rather a reminder of Mexico’s at times conflicting
message on how it sees the future of the region and Mexico’s role as
one of its leaders. PASCUAL