WikiLeak 09MEXICO3573
VZCZCXRO9531RR
RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3573/01 3512042
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 172042Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9478
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T
SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003573
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN NAVY OPERATION NETS DRUG KINGPIN ARTURO
BELTRAN LEYVA
REF: MONTERREY 000453 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).
¶1. (S) Summary.
Mexican Navy forces acting on U.S.information killed Arturo Beltran Leyva in an operation onDecember 16, the highest-level takedown of a cartel figureunder the Calderon administration. The operation is a clearvictory for the Mexican Government and an example ofexcellent USG-GOM cooperation. The unit that conducted theoperation had recieved extensive U.S. training. ArturoBeltran Leyva's death will not solve Mexico's drug problem,but it will hopefully generate the momentum necessary to makesustained progress against other drug traffickingorganizations.
End Summary.
The Operation-------------
¶2. (S) Mexican Navy (SEMAR) sources revealed on the night ofDecember 17 that SEMAR forces killed Arturo Beltran Leyva(ABL), head of the Beltran Leyva Organization, during ashoot-out in Cuernavaca (approximately 50 miles south ofMexico City) that afternoon. At least three other carteloperatives were killed during the raid, with a fourthcommitting suicide. While it still has not been confirmed,Embassy officials believe the latter to be ABL's brother,Hector, which would mean that all Beltran Leyva brothers areeither dead or in prison. Arturo Beltran Leyva has a longhistory of involvement in the Mexican drug trade, and workedwith Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman and his Sinaloa Cartel beforesplitting in 2008. The rivalry between the Sinaloa andBeltran Leyva organizations has been a key factor driving theescalating levels of narcotics-related violence in recentyears. Born in Sinaloa, ABL has been key to the importationand distribution of cocaine and heroin in the United States,and also has extensive money laundering capabilities,corruption networks, and international contacts in Colombiaand the U.S.
¶3. (C) Embassy law enforcement officials say that the arrestoperation targeting ABL began about a week prior to his deathwhen the Embassy relayed detailed information on his locationto SEMAR. The SEMAR unit has been trained extensively byNORTHCOM over the past several years. SEMAR raided anidentified location, where they killed several ABL bodyguardsand arrested over 23 associates, while ABL and Hectorescaped. On Monday, the Embassy interagency linked ABL to anapartment building located in Cuernavaca (about an hour southof Mexico City), where ABL was in hiding. SEMAR initiated anarrest operation on Wednesday afternoon, surrounding theidentified apartment complex, and establishing a securityperimeter. ABL's forces fired on the SEMAR operatives andengaged in a sustained firefight that wounded three SEMARmarines and possibly killed one. SEMAR forces evacuatedresidents of the apartment complex to the gym, according topress accounts, and no civilian casualties have so far beenreported.
The Mexican Interagency-----------------------
¶4. (S) The successful operation against ABL comes on theheels of an aggressive SEMAR effort in Monterrey against Zetaforces (ref a) and highlights its emerging role as a keyplayer in the counternarcotics fight. SEMAR is well-trained,well-equipped, and has shown itself capable of respondingquickly to actionable intelligence. Its success puts theArmy (SEDENA) in the difficult position of explaining why ithas been reluctant to act on good intelligence and conductoperations against high-level targets. The U.S. interagencyoriginally provided the information to SEDENA, whose refusalto move quickly reflected a risk aversion that cost theinstitution a major counternarcotics victory. SEDENA didprovide backup to SEMAR during the firefight with ABL forces,but can take little credit for the operation. PublicSecurity Secretary (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna can also becounted as a net loser in the Mexican interagency followingthe ABL operation. SSP considers high-level Beltran Leyvatargets to be its responsibility, and Garcia Luna has already MEXICO 00003573 002 OF 003 said privately that the operation should have been his.
The Impact on Violence---------------------- ¶
5. (S) It is early to say with a great degree of confidencewhat kind of effect ABL's death will have on levels ofnarco-related violence in Mexico. A spike is probably likelyin the short term as inter- and intra-cartel battles areintensified by the sudden leadership gap in one of thecountry's most important cartels. With all the Beltran Leyvabrothers likely dead or in prison, there are a number ofother cartel functionaries likely to vie for the leadershipslot. Moreover, rival organizations may intensify efforts toexpand their influence in the disarray likely to follow ABL'sdeath. At the very least, efforts to clean the Beltran Leyvahouse and rout out suspected informers will be bloody, andretaliation by the organization against Mexican lawenforcement or military officials is not out of the cards.
¶6. (C) In the medium to longer term, ABL's death could havethe potential to lower the level of narco-violence rates.ABL himself was a particularly violent leader with numerouseffective assassin teams. Moreover, the Sinaloa-BeltranLeyva rivalry has been responsible for a large number ofnarcotics-related homicides in Mexico, and also largelypersonally driven by the Beltran Leyva brothers themselves.Emboffs speculate that Beltran Leyva associates, underpressure and perhaps more vulnerable due to leadershipdeficiencies, could move to align more closely again withSinaloa, which they might think offers a more naturalprotection than the Zetas.
The Boost for Calderon----------------------
¶7. (C) SEMAR's successful operation against ABL is a majorvictory for President Calderon and his war against organizedcrime. ABL is the highest ranking target taken down by theCalderon government, and his status as one of the mostimportant and long-standing of Mexican drug traffickers makeshis takedown even more symbolically important. PresidentCalderon has openly admitted to having a tough year -- hisparty lost big in the midterm elections, he is confronting aneconomic crisis, and nationwide homicide rates continue toclimb -- and contacts have told Poloff that he has seemed"down" in meetings. The SEMAR operation is undoubtedly ahuge boost for him, both in terms of bolstering publicsupport for his security efforts and in reassuring himselfthat important security accomplishments in this area arepossible. Calderon's political opponents will also find itfar less useful to accuse the President of hanging on to anineffective anti-crime strategy that nets numerous mid- tolow-level cartel figures but fails to rein in the majorkingpins. The major Mexico City dailies have run front pageBeltran Leyva stories, and President Calderon's remarks in apress conference from Copenhagen highlighting that the operation represents an "important achievement for the Mexican people and government" were widely covered.
Comment-------
¶8. (S) The operation against Arturo Beltran Leyva is a clearvictory for the Mexican Government and an example ofexcellent USG-GOM cooperation. Seamless Embassy interagencycollaboration combined with a willing, capable, and readySEMAR produced one of the greatest successes to date in thecounternarcotics fight. ABL's death will provide animportant boost to Calderon and hopefully will cultivate agreater sense of confidence within Mexican security agenciesthat will encourage them to take greater advantage of similaropportunities. SEMAR's win in particular may encourageSEDENA to be more proactive and less risk averse in futureoperations. ABL's death will certainly not resolve Mexico'sdrug problem, but it will likely generate the momentumnecessary within the GOM security apparatus to make sustainedand real progress against the country's drug traffickingorganizations.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at MEXICO 00003573 003 OF 003 http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North AmericanPartnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
PASCUAL
RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3573/01 3512042
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 172042Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9478
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T
SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003573
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN NAVY OPERATION NETS DRUG KINGPIN ARTURO
BELTRAN LEYVA
REF: MONTERREY 000453 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).
¶1. (S) Summary.
Mexican Navy forces acting on U.S.information killed Arturo Beltran Leyva in an operation onDecember 16, the highest-level takedown of a cartel figureunder the Calderon administration. The operation is a clearvictory for the Mexican Government and an example ofexcellent USG-GOM cooperation. The unit that conducted theoperation had recieved extensive U.S. training. ArturoBeltran Leyva's death will not solve Mexico's drug problem,but it will hopefully generate the momentum necessary to makesustained progress against other drug traffickingorganizations.
End Summary.
The Operation-------------
¶2. (S) Mexican Navy (SEMAR) sources revealed on the night ofDecember 17 that SEMAR forces killed Arturo Beltran Leyva(ABL), head of the Beltran Leyva Organization, during ashoot-out in Cuernavaca (approximately 50 miles south ofMexico City) that afternoon. At least three other carteloperatives were killed during the raid, with a fourthcommitting suicide. While it still has not been confirmed,Embassy officials believe the latter to be ABL's brother,Hector, which would mean that all Beltran Leyva brothers areeither dead or in prison. Arturo Beltran Leyva has a longhistory of involvement in the Mexican drug trade, and workedwith Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman and his Sinaloa Cartel beforesplitting in 2008. The rivalry between the Sinaloa andBeltran Leyva organizations has been a key factor driving theescalating levels of narcotics-related violence in recentyears. Born in Sinaloa, ABL has been key to the importationand distribution of cocaine and heroin in the United States,and also has extensive money laundering capabilities,corruption networks, and international contacts in Colombiaand the U.S.
¶3. (C) Embassy law enforcement officials say that the arrestoperation targeting ABL began about a week prior to his deathwhen the Embassy relayed detailed information on his locationto SEMAR. The SEMAR unit has been trained extensively byNORTHCOM over the past several years. SEMAR raided anidentified location, where they killed several ABL bodyguardsand arrested over 23 associates, while ABL and Hectorescaped. On Monday, the Embassy interagency linked ABL to anapartment building located in Cuernavaca (about an hour southof Mexico City), where ABL was in hiding. SEMAR initiated anarrest operation on Wednesday afternoon, surrounding theidentified apartment complex, and establishing a securityperimeter. ABL's forces fired on the SEMAR operatives andengaged in a sustained firefight that wounded three SEMARmarines and possibly killed one. SEMAR forces evacuatedresidents of the apartment complex to the gym, according topress accounts, and no civilian casualties have so far beenreported.
The Mexican Interagency-----------------------
¶4. (S) The successful operation against ABL comes on theheels of an aggressive SEMAR effort in Monterrey against Zetaforces (ref a) and highlights its emerging role as a keyplayer in the counternarcotics fight. SEMAR is well-trained,well-equipped, and has shown itself capable of respondingquickly to actionable intelligence. Its success puts theArmy (SEDENA) in the difficult position of explaining why ithas been reluctant to act on good intelligence and conductoperations against high-level targets. The U.S. interagencyoriginally provided the information to SEDENA, whose refusalto move quickly reflected a risk aversion that cost theinstitution a major counternarcotics victory. SEDENA didprovide backup to SEMAR during the firefight with ABL forces,but can take little credit for the operation. PublicSecurity Secretary (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna can also becounted as a net loser in the Mexican interagency followingthe ABL operation. SSP considers high-level Beltran Leyvatargets to be its responsibility, and Garcia Luna has already MEXICO 00003573 002 OF 003 said privately that the operation should have been his.
The Impact on Violence---------------------- ¶
5. (S) It is early to say with a great degree of confidencewhat kind of effect ABL's death will have on levels ofnarco-related violence in Mexico. A spike is probably likelyin the short term as inter- and intra-cartel battles areintensified by the sudden leadership gap in one of thecountry's most important cartels. With all the Beltran Leyvabrothers likely dead or in prison, there are a number ofother cartel functionaries likely to vie for the leadershipslot. Moreover, rival organizations may intensify efforts toexpand their influence in the disarray likely to follow ABL'sdeath. At the very least, efforts to clean the Beltran Leyvahouse and rout out suspected informers will be bloody, andretaliation by the organization against Mexican lawenforcement or military officials is not out of the cards.
¶6. (C) In the medium to longer term, ABL's death could havethe potential to lower the level of narco-violence rates.ABL himself was a particularly violent leader with numerouseffective assassin teams. Moreover, the Sinaloa-BeltranLeyva rivalry has been responsible for a large number ofnarcotics-related homicides in Mexico, and also largelypersonally driven by the Beltran Leyva brothers themselves.Emboffs speculate that Beltran Leyva associates, underpressure and perhaps more vulnerable due to leadershipdeficiencies, could move to align more closely again withSinaloa, which they might think offers a more naturalprotection than the Zetas.
The Boost for Calderon----------------------
¶7. (C) SEMAR's successful operation against ABL is a majorvictory for President Calderon and his war against organizedcrime. ABL is the highest ranking target taken down by theCalderon government, and his status as one of the mostimportant and long-standing of Mexican drug traffickers makeshis takedown even more symbolically important. PresidentCalderon has openly admitted to having a tough year -- hisparty lost big in the midterm elections, he is confronting aneconomic crisis, and nationwide homicide rates continue toclimb -- and contacts have told Poloff that he has seemed"down" in meetings. The SEMAR operation is undoubtedly ahuge boost for him, both in terms of bolstering publicsupport for his security efforts and in reassuring himselfthat important security accomplishments in this area arepossible. Calderon's political opponents will also find itfar less useful to accuse the President of hanging on to anineffective anti-crime strategy that nets numerous mid- tolow-level cartel figures but fails to rein in the majorkingpins. The major Mexico City dailies have run front pageBeltran Leyva stories, and President Calderon's remarks in apress conference from Copenhagen highlighting that the operation represents an "important achievement for the Mexican people and government" were widely covered.
Comment-------
¶8. (S) The operation against Arturo Beltran Leyva is a clearvictory for the Mexican Government and an example ofexcellent USG-GOM cooperation. Seamless Embassy interagencycollaboration combined with a willing, capable, and readySEMAR produced one of the greatest successes to date in thecounternarcotics fight. ABL's death will provide animportant boost to Calderon and hopefully will cultivate agreater sense of confidence within Mexican security agenciesthat will encourage them to take greater advantage of similaropportunities. SEMAR's win in particular may encourageSEDENA to be more proactive and less risk averse in futureoperations. ABL's death will certainly not resolve Mexico'sdrug problem, but it will likely generate the momentumnecessary within the GOM security apparatus to make sustainedand real progress against the country's drug traffickingorganizations.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at MEXICO 00003573 003 OF 003 http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North AmericanPartnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
PASCUAL
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